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Abstract The causes of non-acceptance of evolution are
groupable into five categories: inadequate understanding of
the empirical evidence and the content of modern evolu-
tionary theory, inadequate understanding of the nature of
science, religion, various psychological factors, and polit-
ical and social factors. This multiplicity of causes is not
sufficiently appreciated by many scientists, educators, and
journalists, and the widespread rejection of evolution is a
much more complicated problem than many of these front-
line practitioners think it is. Solutions to the widespread
non-acceptance of evolution must therefore involve not just
further resolution of the “religion vs. science” controversy.
They must also involve better communication of empirical
evidence for evolution, more effective explication of the
nature of science, and explicitly addressing the numerous
significant psychological obstacles that evolution presents
to many (perhaps most) people. There is no clear roadmap
to how to do all of this, but some practical recommenda-
tions include (1) more research on why and when different
people accept or do not accept evolution when they are
exposed to it, especially the role of “scientific” vs.
“affective” causes for non-acceptance, and also on appar-
ently deeply rooted psychological obstacles to acceptance.
(2) A more explicit approach to explication and under-
standing of the causes for non-acceptance of evolution
should support the often-stated goal of understanding
“where students are” prior to implementing the kind of
approaches frequently advocated for teaching evolution.
(3) Integration of multiple educational perspectives and
academic disciplines to support application of pedagogical
strategies in actual educational settings. (4) Increased
development and application of approaches to evolution
education in settings beyond the K–16 classroom, such as
museums, nature centers, zoos, parks, and aquaria.
Keywords Evolution . Creationism . Belief . Acceptance .
Religion . Psychology . Politics
It is almost as if the human brain were specifically
designed to misunderstand Darwinism, and to find it
hard to believe. (Dawkins 1996)
Why people do not believe in evolution has no simple
answer. (Williams 2009)
I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of
the society but the people themselves; and if we think
them not enlightened enough to exercise their control
with a wholesome direction, the remedy is not to take
it from them, but to inform their discretion by
education. (Thomas Jefferson to William C. Jarvis,
Sept. 28, 1820)
Introduction
About half of American adults do not accept organic
evolution as an accurate factual statement about nature, a
number that, according to polls, has remained approximate-
ly constant over the past several decades (Bishop 2007;
Plutzer and Berkman 2008). The U.S. ranks near the
bottom of industrialized countries in which acceptance of
evolution has been polled (Mazur 2005; Miller et al. 2006),
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although there are signs that non-acceptance of evolution
may be rising in other countries (e.g., Cornish-Bowden and
Cárdenas 2007; Branch 2008; Williams 2009; Brown 2010).
Surveys of American college students similarly indicate low
levels of both acceptance and knowledge of evolution (Nehm
and Reilly 2007; Lovely and Kondrick 2008; Cunningham
and Wescott 2009; Jakobi 2010). Surveys of American
public school teachers also find wide variation in knowledge,
belief, and amount of class time devoted to evolution
(Rutledge and Warden 2000; Rutledge and Mitchell 2002;
Trani 2004; Bowman 2008; Berkman et al. 2008; Moore
2008; Moore and Cotner 2009; Berkman and Plutzer 2010,
2011; Deniz and Donnelly 2011). In other words, there is a
“great disconnect” between the views of scientists and non-
scientists on evolution (Wiles 2010). Evolution “remains a
minority view in the general understanding” (Nickels et al.
1996), and most Americans (and many people elsewhere)
“view the biological world from a kind of pre-Darwinian
perspective” (Rudolph and Stewart 1998).
In response, much attention has been devoted in the past
20 years, by both scientists and educators, to the field that
has come to be known as “evolution education” (Smith et
al. 1995; National Academy of Sciences 1998; Alters and
Alters 2001; Alters and Nelson 2002; Alters 2005; Wilson
2005; Diamond 2006; Meadows 2009; O’Brien et al. 2009;
Nehm and Schonfeld 2007; Ellis 2010; Smith 2010a, b;
Oliveira et al. 2011). As a result, it is no longer true that
students’ understanding of evolution is under-researched
(Cummins et al. 1994), and we now know a great deal more
than we used to about what students think about evolution
and what pedagogical approaches work and why.
Less attention, however, has been given to the causes for
these high levels of non-acceptance (aka “disbelief,”
“rejection,” “denial”) in the first place. Although this question
has recently been the subject of increased discussion and
research (e.g., Evans 2008; Hokayem and BouJaoude 2008;
Richards 2008; Sinatra et al. 2008; Thagard and Findlay
2009; Williams 2009; Mead and Scott 2010a, b; Nadelson
and Southerland 2010; Smith 2010a, b; Tracy et al. 2011;
Shtulman 2011; Shtulman et al. 2008; Kampourakis and
McComas 2010; Wiles et al. 2011), and there is growing
agreement on the general conclusion that the causes of non-
acceptance of evolution are numerous, diverse, and complex;
most of the scholarly literature on this topic treats causes one
or two at a time; and many if not most discussions for
students or general readers are relatively brief and/or over-
simplified (e.g., Freeman and Herron 2007; Coyne 2009a;
Futuyma 2009; Meadows 2009; Shermer 2006), or also
focus on only one or two potential causes. Yet this is not the
way most students or members of the general public come to
evolution; they arrive with all of these numerous, diverse,
and complex factors mixed up in their minds in ways that
even they may not understand. Religion, for example, is not
the only or even the main source of resistance to evolution
for many people; it interacts in complex ways with numerous
other factors which, if unacknowledged, can scuttle attempts
to increase acceptance of evolution. Furthermore, most of the
attention given this topic in the literature has focused on
classroom settings, and not on venues outside the classroom
(which are more numerous and, arguably, more important for
life-long learning). My own experience in evolution educa-
tion over the past three decades—in high school and college
undergraduate classes, as well as in museums and other
“informal” venues—strongly suggests that, despite all of the
research conducted and published during these years, the
practitioners who develop and present content on the front
lines—professors, teachers, informal educators, exhibit
designers, film producers, and others—still lack an accessible
but authoritative overview of all of the potential major causes
for resistance to or non-acceptance of evolution. Without such
an overview, these practitioners can only proceed with some
combination of (1) assuming that we already know the one or
two causes and how to deal with them and applying a one-
size-fits-all pedagogy that assumes that all resistance to
evolution is due to these causes, or (2) delving into the
scholarly literature and assembling their own list of possible
causes and tools for assessing which ones are most important
for their particular audiences.
Justification for such an overview also comes from
another source. As has been argued by several authors (e.g.,
Lipps 2006; Cornish-Bowden and Cárdenas 2007; Prothero
2007), evolution education is not just about teaching in the
traditional sense. Most opponents of evolution do not
operate within traditional structured educational settings,
practices, or budgets. On the contrary, they tend to work
through non-educational institutions (such as churches) and
the popular media, and they are frequently better funded
than advocates for evolution. In other words, evolution
education is also about marketing. Just as in commercial
marketing, in which “understanding what motivates the
audience is critical to creating effective advertising” (Wells
et al. 2006), understanding the full spectrum of causes for
why so many people do not think evolution is true is critical
for increasing their acceptance. Just as advertising may fail
if it is not targeted at what consumers really think or feel,
evolution education may fail if educators assume incorrectly
that they know why their particular target learners do not
accept what they are saying. Commercial advertisers know that
consumers decide on purchases for a wide variety of reasons,
from emotional to rational: because something catches their
eye in the checkout, or because they have done careful research
and follow an “information-driven process,” or something in
between (Wells et al. 2006). Similarly, people reject evolution
not only because of their religious beliefs but also because of
a combination of other factors, including inadequate or
erroneous factual knowledge; multiple, deep psychological
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obstacles; and sociopolitical factors. It may frequently be
difficult to determine what this combination is, but only with
some awareness of the full spectrum of potential causes of
this resistance can educators select pedagogical approaches
that might be appropriate for the needs of their particular
audience, both in and outside the classroom.
Several classifications of the causes for non-acceptance
of evolution have been proposed (Alters and Alters 2001;
Alters 2005; Smith 2010a, b; Wiles et al. 2011). I follow
these fairly closely here but at the highest level divide
causes into what may be called “proximate” or “primary”
causes for individual non-acceptance of evolution (Table 1)
as opposed to the numerous potential “ultimate” or
“secondary” explanations for why the primary causes exist
and seem to be resistant to change (Table 2) (the latter
constitute their own enormous topic that is beyond the
scope of this paper). For example, college students may not
accept evolution mainly because they harbor numerous
factual misconceptions about it; this is a “proximate/
primary” reason. Those students may, however, have so
many misconceptions for the “ultimate/secondary” reason
that the teaching of evolution is ineffective.
Recent reviews of potential causes for non-acceptance of
evolution (e.g., Smith 2010a, b; Wiles et al. 2011) also
discuss pedagogical strategies for addressing at least some
of these causes. Most of these discussions, however, apply
only or largely to the formal or classroom setting and give
less attention to how the same causes affect views outside
the classroom. Yet it is here that people spend most of their
lives (Falk and Dierking 2010). In this paper, therefore, I
try to focus on the proximal/primary causes for non-
acceptance not only in the classroom but also in informal
educational settings, such as museums, which are major
potential resources for evolution education (Evans et al.
2010; Allmon et al. 2012).
The overview presented here is primarily a statement of
the problem rather than a set of proposed solutions. This
paper focuses on why individuals think evolution is not
true, not on what exactly to do about that. Since, however,
the reason for focusing on causes of non-acceptance is
because it can yield important practical lessons for
lessening non-acceptance, I will also briefly discuss some
of these lessons and offer some recommendations that
reasonably arise from them.
Definitions
Many authors have pointed out that much confusion around
the topic of evolution can be traced to terminology (Thomson
1982; Kugler 2002; Moore et al. 2002; Thompson 2008;
Scott and Branch 2009; Mead and Scott 2010a, b), and this
complicates the selection of the specific aspect(s) of
evolution with which an individual should agree with for it
to be judged that they “accept” it (Smith 2010a, b). This
confusion starts with the word “evolution” itself, which is
frequently used to refer to both descent with modification/
common ancestry (DWM) and mechanisms by which this
occurs (mainly natural selection). The term “Darwinism” is
similarly used ambiguously (Mayr 1986; Ruse 1992; Scott
and Branch 2009; Hull 2011). As evidenced by the initial
scientific response to the publication of On the Origin of
Species, it is possible to accept DWM without accepting
natural selection; as is well-known, for example, by the time
of Darwin’s death in 1882, virtually all scientists and many
non-scientists accepted that life had evolved, but natural
selection was not widely accepted as the most important
evolutionary mechanism until the 1940s (Hull 1973; Bowler
1983; Ruse 1999). It is likely DWM that most frequently
comes to mind when most people hear the word “evolution”
(e.g., most modern polls on “evolution” refer to DWM,
rather than natural selection, and most images of “evolution”
in popular culture [such as cartoons] are to DWM rather than
evolutionary mechanisms; e.g., Browne 2001; Clark 2009).
As discussed further below, however, acceptance or rejection
of DWM may also be strongly affected by misunderstanding
of or discomfort with natural selection as an evolutionary
Table 2 Some major “ultimate/secondary” causes for widespread
non-acceptance of evolution in the United States
General anti-intellectualism (see, e.g., Hofstadter 1963; Pierce 2009)
Low scientific literacy (Hazen and Trefil 2009) and/or distrust of
science (e.g., Sagan 1996; Mooney and Kirschenbaum 2009;
Berkman and Plutzer 2009, 2010)
Poor teaching (of science generally and evolution in particular) (e.g.,
Alters and Nelson 2002)
Strength, diversity, and decentralization of American religious belief
(Lachman 1993; Numbers 2006)
Decentralization of American public education (Antolin and Herbers
2001; Berkman and Plutzer 2010)
Table 1 Summary classification of “proximate/primary” causes of
non-acceptance of evolution
Scientific causes
Insufficient knowledge of empirical evidence
Insufficient knowledge/misunderstanding of evolutionary theory





Biases in how we see the world
Logical thinking
Political/social obstacles
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mechanism (Gould 1974; Bishop and Anderson 1990; Brem
et al. 2003).
Even if “evolution” is limited only to DWM, it is clear
that non-scientists as a whole do not simply agree or
disagree with it but maintain a complex spectrum of views
(Evans 2000b; Brem et al. 2003; Ingram and Nelson 2006;
Scott 2009; Brown 2010). Education researchers investi-
gating views about evolution have used various survey
questions to address this (Rutledge and Warden 1999;
Anderson et al. 2002; Ingram and Nelson 2006; Rutledge
and Sadler 2007; Shtulman et al. 2008; Southerland and
Nadelson 2011), including whether species have changed
over time, whether the species in existence today have
always existed, whether natural selection is the best
explanation for adaptation, whether DWM (with or without
natural selection) can account for the appearance of new
species, and whether DWM applies to humans. These
studies indicate that the general public is often unclear
about exactly what they know or accept about evolution.
Discussions of science in general, and evolution in
particular, are also significantly complicated by conflicting
and inconsistent use and meanings of the terms “belief,”
“acceptance,” “knowledge,” and “understanding.” As sum-
marized by Smith and Siegel (2004), modern vernacular
usage of these words is enormously variable. Within the
realm of evolution education, for example, “knowledge”
may require “belief” or not, or vice versa (reviewed in
Southerland et al. 2001; Smith and Siegel 2004). Some
authors use “belief” and “acceptance” more or less
interchangeably, with or without comment (e.g., Lawson
1983; Newell 1984; Lawson and Weser 1990; Lawson and
Worsnop 1992; National Academy of Sciences 1998;
McKeachie et al. 2002; Sinatra et al. 2003). Some argue
that “belief” and “knowledge” are effectively indistinguish-
able (Cobern 1994, 2000). Scientific probability has been
defined as “degree of rational belief” or “degree of
rationality of a belief” (Popper 1959). Richard Dawkins
(1997) proudly states “I believe in the fact of evolution”
and defines faith as “belief that isn’t based on evidence.”
Untangling the linguistic, semantic, and philosophical
issues underlying this multiplicity of meaning and usage is
truly daunting and well outside the scope of this paper. For
my purposes, therefore, I will use the following definitions
(see also Fig. 1):
Knowledge—a proposition or conception that repre-
sents what a wider community employs as the best,
current description of an aspect of reality in the
external world and for which a learner must have
reasons that provide justification or warrant (cf., Plato’s
“reasoned” or “justified true belief”; Southerland et al.
2001). Knowledge in this sense is larger than what a
single individual holds to be true. Holding some things
to be true is, of course, necessary for individual
survival, but is not sufficient for propositions or con-
ceptions generally treated as “science.”Knowledge in this
sense might be said to be “acceptance” (see below) by a
wider community.
Acceptance—the act or state of agreement that a
proposition or conception is true, based on “an
examination of the plausibility, persuasiveness, and
fruitfulness of the empirical support for the construct”
and “not dependent on personal perspectives of the
supernatural, nature, and the world, but rather a
rational evaluation of that knowledge claim” (Nadelson
and Southerland 2010).
Belief—a proposition or conception held by an
individual to be true, regardless of whether that individual
has particular empirical causes for doing so; beliefs have
less rigid criteria than knowledge or acceptance and can
be “extrarational” and “have little correspondence with
the outside world” (Southerland et al. 2001). Believing is
the act or state of agreement with a belief.
Understanding—the act or state of comprehending
how it is that a particular proposition or conception
operates (whether or not it is held to be true) and the
linkages and connections among its constituent ele-
ments or aspects (Gauld 2001, as discussed in Smith
and Siegel 2004). Understanding is therefore “deeper”
or more trenchant than acceptance or knowledge.
If we adopt these definitions, belief is the general term
for thinking that a proposition (such as evolution) is true,
with acceptance being a more restricted subset (Fig. 1).
The terms “non-belief” and “non-believer” can, however,
easily be interpreted as implying some kind of equiva-
lence between science and religion (Southerland et al.
2001). At the risk of imprecision and/or inaccuracy, I will
therefore use the terms “non-acceptance” and “non-
acceptor” below for all instances of not thinking that
evolution is true, regardless of whether that is due to




Fig. 1 Schematic representation of the relationship among the terms/
concepts “belief,” “acceptance,” and “knowledge” as used in this
paper
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In the context of these working definitions of these
terms, one major substantive aspect of their relationships
should also be mentioned: the question of what the
fundamental pedagogical goal of modern science educa-
tion should be. That is, exactly what is it that educators
want students to be able to do at the end of the day
(Davson-Galle 2004)?
Some authors argue that the goal of science education
should be no more (and no less) than to foster student
understanding, with or without acceptance, of “the content
of science, the current best explanations of how things
work—as well as the nature and methods of science”
(Smith and Siegel 2004; see also Cooper 2001; Southerland
et al. 2001; Alters and Nelson 2002). In this view, it is
“morally questionable” to require that students believe or
accept a particular scientific proposition because it amounts
to “scientism” [“the position that all of a person’s beliefs
should be based on science” (Smith and Siegel 2004)] and
potentially infringes on student religious beliefs and/or
autonomy (Southerland et al. 2001; Smith and Siegel
2004). Science education should, in this view, “aim at
knowledge and understanding of the theory, and let student
belief fall where it may” (Smith and Siegel 2004). Indeed,
several studies report that students can successfully dem-
onstrate an ability to describe and apply modern evolution-
ary theory (e.g., on exams) but then state that they do
not accept (or “believe”) it (e.g., Bishop and Anderson
1990; Lord and Marino 1993; Demastes et al. 1995a, b;
Chinn and Samarapungavan 2001; Ingram and Nelson
2006; Lombrozo et al. 2006). To “those who find it
inadequate or unsatisfying that the science teacher should
leave student belief aside,” suggest Smith and Siegel
[2004], there may be some “comfort in realizing that belief
typically follows understanding, and that, when it doesn’t,
that disconnect is usually the result of strongly held
convictions that science by itself cannot undermine or
adequately address.”
Other authors, however, strongly disagree with this
approach, and maintain that the primary goal of science
education should be “changing student beliefs,” specifically
the abandonment by students of all nonscientific explan-
ations for the phenomena that evolution by natural selection
seeks to explain (Lawson and Worsnop 1992; Alters 1997;
Chinn and Samarapungavan 2001). In this view, any real
understanding of a scientific proposition (such as evolu-
tion) cannot be achieved without acceptance of that
proposition as true, and lack of acceptance can be a serious
barrier to scientific understanding (Lawson 1983; Cobern
1994; McKeachie et al. 2002; Davson-Galle 2004). There is
a strong practical (and philosophical) argument in favor of
this point of view: most people would like trained scientists
to be correct. Although “teachers are often uncomfortable
with viewing themselves as persuaders…almost everyone
would prefer that civil engineers actually believe the well-
established principles of building safe bridges that they
learn in their engineering classes” (Chinn and Samarapun-
gavan 2001), and most people would likely prefer a
physician who actually accepts the truth of most of what
he or she learned in medical school, rather than just going
through the motions as though they thought it was true
(Pennock 1999; Ruse 2001).
Finally, it has also been argued that students cannot
accept a theory unless they develop at least some
understanding of it (Lawson and Worsnop 1992; Sinatra
et al. 2003). At the other extreme, some students can accept
evolution but not demonstrate strong understanding of it
(Bishop and Anderson 1990; Lord and Marino 1993;
Sinatra et al. 2003; Cavallo and McCall 2008; Deniz and
Donnelly 2011; see Wiles et al. 2011 for a review). In this
paper, I leave this extremely important issue unresolved.
Causes of Non-acceptance
Insufficient/Incorrect Factual Knowledge
The hypothesis that non-acceptance of a particular
scientific conclusion, theory, or idea is mainly due to
insufficient knowledge is intuitively appealing, especially
to educators, who usually view their job to be communi-
cation and explication of such conclusions, theories, and
ideas. Some level of familiarity with empirical “facts” is
obviously required for rational acceptance of any idea
about the material world (e.g., if you don’t know that the
Second World War came before the Vietnam War,
twentieth century American history doesn’t make much
sense). There is, indeed, considerable evidence that at
least some non-acceptance of evolution is due to lack
of adequate familiarity with and/or understanding of
the “facts”—the evidence that evolution itself has oc-
curred and/or what modern evolutionary theory actually
claims.
At the most general level, several studies have found that
level of education is positively correlated with acceptance
of evolution (People for the American Way Foundation
2000; Brumfiel 2005), although this correlation seems to
apply less for “Intelligent Design,” many advocates of
which are highly educated (Shanks 2004; Scott 2009).
More specifically, recent polls of Americans indicate low
basic knowledge of science in general, and biology and
geology in particular.
For example, only 38% of American adults agree that
humans have more than half of their genes in common with
chimpanzees; fewer than half of American adults can
provide a minimal definition of the role of DNA in heredity
(Miller et al. 2006; Miller 2010). Less than a third of
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respondents in most surveys give accurate descriptions of
natural selection (Brumby 1984; Bishop and Anderson
1990; Greene 1990; Demastes et al. 1995a, b; Ferrari and
Chi 1998; Anderson et al. 2002; Nehm and Reilly 2007;
Gregory 2009; Nehm et al. 2009). Knowledge of the fossil
record is similarly poor; only 59% of respondents to a
recent poll, for example, know that the earliest humans
and dinosaurs did not live at the same time (California
Academy of Sciences 2009). Catley and Novick (2009)
report “startlingly large” variation among college students
in their knowledge of the relative and numerical timing of
various events in the history of life (e.g., the age of the
Earth, dinosaur extinction, the appearance of the genus
Homo) (see also Cotner et al. 2010; Allmon et al. 2011
and references therein). Nelson (2008) writes that students
in his college courses “thought of fossils as rare and more
or less haphazardly scattered across the landscape,” rather
than providing abundant and consistent evidence of the
chronology of life.
Given this low level of general scientific literacy, it is not
surprising that many people think that empirical evidence
for evolution is sparse. For example, surveys of American
college students have found that 20–50% think that there is
abundant credible evidence against evolution, that modern
evolutionary theory lacks “a valid scientific foundation,”
and/or that “evolution is far from being proven scientifi-
cally” (Lord and Marino 1993; Cunningham and Wescott
2009; People for the American Way Foundation 2000) (as
Shtulman 2006 notes, “those who do not endorse the claim
that Darwin’s theory of evolution has been well supported
by evidence tend to endorse the alternative claim [i.e., that
Darwin’s theory of evolution has not been well supported
by evidence] rather than plead ignorance”). Thus, when
creationists claim that there are “no intermediate fossils”
(Denton 1986; Johnson 1991; Gish 1995), when in fact
they are abundant in the geological record (Padian et al.
1999; Prothero 2007), a largely uninformed public accepts
such statements. As Hofmann and Weber (2003) point out,
if you don’t know much about the fossil record or genetics,
then critiques of evolution such as Wells (2002) can sound
quite plausible. Similarly, Asghar et al. (2007) report that
lack of specific content knowledge among teachers has a
negative effect on the decision of whether to include
evolution in their curriculum.
Students and the general public also hold a wide variety
of specific misconceptions about what modern evolutionary
biology says (Brumby 1984; Bishop and Anderson 1990;
Ferrari and Chi 1998; Antolin and Herbers 2001; Woods
and Scharmann 2001; Alters and Nelson 2002; Anderson et
al. 2002; Isaak 2006; McVaugh et al. 2011; Shtulman et al.
2008; Wiles et al. 2011). For example, many think that new
functional traits appear in organisms when they are needed;
that evolution consists of the transformation of an entire
species’ underlying essence; that it necessarily implies
“randomness,” “progress,” or increasing complexity; or that
it is mathematically improbable or violates the second law
of thermodynamics. Such misunderstandings affect accep-
tance of evolution because if many people think that they
understand evolution, when in fact they do not, they may
not only “fail to appreciate how empirical evidence bears
on evolutionary claims” (Lombrozo et al. 2006) but they
can also be misled by critiques of these mistaken views
(Cunningham and Wescott 2009; Jakobi 2010; McVaugh
et al. 2011). That such misconceptions are at least
occasionally important barriers to accepting evolution is
indicated by studies in which acceptance is increased by
“presenting students with a direct comparison of various
naïve misconceptions associated with creationism to
explanations which are more consistent with scientific
evidence” (Alters 2005; see also Alters and Nelson 2002;
Ingram and Nelson 2006; Nelson 2007; Verhey 2005;
Wilson 2005; Wiles et al. 2011).
Another important area of “insufficient knowledge” of
evolution is that non-acceptors may not understand just
how useful evolution is as a scientific hypothesis. One
reason scientists accept a theory is because it explains
many, often diverse, observations. They may even accept
ideas that might otherwise seem counterintuitive or not
directly observable if they explain enough observations
(e.g., relativity, plate tectonics). Non-acceptors may not
be aware of how powerful evolution is as a theory, not
only in how it famously “makes sense” of all of biology
(Dobzhansky 1973) but also explains observations in
disparate areas of applied biology of great relevance to
human welfare, from domestication to medicine (Wilson
2005, 2007; Mindel 2006; Antolin 2009; O’Brien et al.
2009; Hendry et al. 2011).
Inadequate/Incorrect Understanding of the Nature
of Science
Scientists and educators alike frequently state that one of
the biggest causes of non-acceptance of evolution is a
widespread lack of understanding of the “nature of science”
(NOS; Nickels et al. 1996; McComas et al. 1998; National
Academy of Sciences 1998; Nelson et al. 1998; Rudolph
and Stewart 1998; Rutledge and Warden 2000; Alters and
Alters 2001; Pigliucci 2002; Farber 2003; Trani 2004;
Scharmann et al. 2005; Lombrozo et al. 2006, 2008;
Pigliucci 2007; Scott 2009; Thagard and Findlay 2009;
Ellis 2010; Kampourakis and McComas 2010; Cho et al.
2011). Scott (2009) notes that in the landmark 2005 court
case on teaching intelligent design in public school class-
rooms (Kitzmiller v. Dover), “All of the plaintiffs’ expert
witnesses spoke to the question of the nature of science…”
[lack of understanding of NOS cannot be the only
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explanation for non-acceptance of evolution, since it does
not explain “why antipathy towards the theory of evolution
is stronger than to other scientific theories, such as the
theory of gravity” (Evans 2008)].
Enhancing learners’ understanding of NOS is a long-
standing goal of science education in general (e.g., Moore
1993; National Academy of Sciences 1998; Cobern 2000;
Lederman 2004; McDonald 2010; Yacoubian and BouJaoude
2010). Part of the problem, however, is that scientists and
philosophers of science themselves disagree about what
exactly the nature of science is (Alters 1997; Abd-El-
Khalick et al. 1998; Rudolph 2000; Lederman 2004; Abd-
El-Khalick 2005; Cho et al. 2011; Duschl et al. 2011).
Traditionally, “the scientific method” has been presented
(especially in classrooms) as a “fairly rigid sequence of steps,
followed like a recipe and leading to irrefutable results”
(McComas et al. 1998). This long-standing hegemony of
realism in science has, however, coexisted uneasily, almost
since science began, with another very different line of
thought, which emphasizes the similarities between science
and other human pursuits, such as subjectivity, bias, and
social influence, and argues that despite the evident success
of science, we are not nearly as certain of its conclusions as
we like to think. These views have gone under many names,
including relativism, skepticism, deconstructionism, con-
structivism, and postmodernism (Golinski 1998). Thus, there
is a central paradox to science: Humans appear to have the
ability to sense and comprehend at least some “real” aspects
of the world around us, yet this ability is not perfect, and
what we make of the world is, therefore, often shaped as
much or more by our feelings, hopes, prejudices, fears,
desires, and preconceived ideas as it is by empirical
observations and rigorous logic (e.g., Bridgman 1955;
Golinski 1998; Chalmers 1999; Gauch 2003; Haack 2007;
Lombrozo et al. 2008). In this view, real science as scientists
do it includes an array of social interactions and “dialectical
processes that shape the role theory, evidence, explanation,
and models have in the development of scientific knowl-
edge” (Duschl et al. 2011). As nicely put by Brown and
Gibson (1983), “most practicing scientists know that a
scientific inquiry is much more like working on a puzzle or
being lost in the woods than baking cookies or following a
roadmap.”
Much of the relativist/realist debates of the past
couple of decades, sometimes referred to as the “science
wars” (Parsons 2003), have died down, and some
relatively clear standards for teaching NOS have been
put forward during this time (e.g., Lederman 1992;
Nickels et al. 1996; McComas et al. 1998; National
Academy of Sciences 1998). Yet the relative roles of
objectivity, certainty, social embeddedness, gender bias,
and other factors in the process of science, and the best
way to teach its apparently inescapably paradoxical
character, remain complex, controversial, and unresolved
(e.g., Weinberg 2001; McComas 2002; Blystone and
Blodgett 2006; Haack 2007; Lombrozo et al. 2008;
Yacoubian and BouJaoude 2010). This lack of consensus
about what NOS actually is and especially about how it
should be taught has important implications for accep-
tance of evolution. For instance, individuals who think
that science is about absolute certainty may not under-
stand when scientific conclusions change in light of new
data or revised ideas (Chinn and Malhotra 2002).
Individuals who learn that all science is a social construct
may reject scientists as just another vocal special interest
(Sokal 2008).
Another common example of misunderstanding of NOS
in evolution education is the importance of what is usually
called simply “inference” [but, more accurately, “inductive
inference” (Ziman 2000)], that is, the extrapolation from
observations to a larger pattern that is not observed directly.
One of Darwin’s greatest innovations was to argue
(following the approach advocated by his friend Charles
Lyell) that one could use observed small-scale change in
organisms to infer (and explain) large-scale change. The
first chapter of the Origin of Species, for example, is mainly
about pigeons because Darwin wanted to convince his
readers of the validity of extrapolating from small changes
produced by artificial breeding over short time intervals to
larger changes produced by natural selection over geolog-
ical time [this is sometimes discussed as an example of
Darwin’s use of metaphor, which is also a means of
extending reasoning from one idea to another (Young 1985;
Ruse 2005; Pramling 2008; Gregory 2009b; Largent
2009)]. Change under domestication and similar phenom-
ena familiar to most people today, such as antibiotic and
pesticide resistance, or changes in the HIV virus (Freeman
and Herron 2007; Gregory 2009b) are frequently acknowl-
edged (as they must be) by creationists, who otherwise
reject the validity of extrapolating from such “microevolu-
tion” to “macroevolution” (Johnson 1991). On one hand,
such rejection is consistent with intuition. Surveys of both
students and the general public similarly show greater
acceptance of microevolutionary than of macroevolutionary
concepts (Poling and Evans 2004) because the former is
“directly observable” whereas the latter is not [interestingly,
increasing the teaching of macroevolution seems to result,
at least occasionally, in increased acceptance of evolution
(Nadelson and Southerland 2010; Padian 2010; see dis-
cussion in Smith 2010b), perhaps because it involves
explicating more specific examples from the fossil record].
On the other hand, rejecting the extrapolation from micro-
to macroevolution is inconsistent with the application of
inference common to all science. For example, if we drop a
ball, we can measure how fast it falls; we can then use this
result to apply to other falling objects. All scientific
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hypotheses are essentially about applying what is known
(from observation and/or experiment) to what is unknown.
If we had to personally observe everything in science to be
certain of it, no progress could ever be made in our
understanding of the world.
A similarly major issue around NOS and creationism is
the application of materialism. Advocates of ID, for
example, claim that they are challenging the “philosophy
of scientific materialism, not science itself” (Discovery
2003). This is a useful rhetorical approach in their public
statements as it allows them to appear moderate and
reasonable and unthreatening to fields such as medicine,
engineering, and agriculture that have obvious personal and
economic benefits. Such critics of evolution therefore
apparently allow extrapolation (of material causes) to areas
that they accept, but not to areas that they do not (where
they claim that supernatural causes are required). They may
claim that they use science and the technology that comes
from it, just like everyone else: “The possibility that divine
intervention may occur…emphatically does not imply that
all events are the product of an unpredictable divine
whimsy” (Johnson 1995). Yet, as Pennock (1999) notes,
they never explain what the methods are for determining
when divine intervention is and is not to be considered
potentially responsible for a particular event. While
acknowledging that some theologies may describe God as
capriciously and frequently intervening in the natural
workings of the world, some creationists argue that a
correct Christian view “holds that secondary causality
(causation by natural laws) is God’s usual mode and
primary causality (direct divine acts or miracles) is
infrequent, comparatively speaking” and that science
should not defer to such primary causality “willy-nilly”
(Moreland 1989, quoted in Alters and Alters 2001). But,
again, there is no definition of “willy-nilly.” This inconsis-
tency—which Nanda (2003) has called “reactionary mod-
ernism”—cuts to the heart of the scientific method, which
must consider only material causes for material phenomena.
Numerous defenders of evolution have tried to approach
this issue by arguing for the importance of distinguishing
“methodological” materialism from “philosophical” or
“ontological” materialism (Pennock 1999; Scott 2009).
Religion
Historically, religious objections were perhaps the strongest
among the immediate negative reactions to the publication
of the Origin (Hull 1973; Farley 1974; Ruse 1999; but see
Livingstone 1984), and religious belief is widely regarded
by education researchers as a major reason for modern non-
acceptance of evolution (Bishop and Anderson 1990; Osif
1997; Lawson and Worsnop 1992; Sinclair and Pendarvis
1997; Aguillard 1999; Downie and Barron 2000; Antolin
and Herbers 2001; Evans 2001; Brem et al. 2003; Sinatra et
al. 2003; Trani 2004; Mazur 2005; Miller et al. 2006; Nehm
et al. 2009; Woods and Scharmann 2001; Jakobi 2010; Paz-
y-Miño and Espinosa 2010; Tracy et al. 2011). Specifically,
evolution appears to call into question the literal truth of
some religious scripture, not only in the Judeo-Christian
Bible (Cantor and Swetlitz 2006; Robbins and Cohen
2008) but also the Quran (Edis 2007) and Hindu texts such
as the Bhagavad Gita (Brown 2010). More generally,
however, evolution is seen by many critics as “more than a
scientific theory—it is a powerful medium for the
propagation of materialism and atheism…associated with
a variety of social ills: racism, moral relativism, abortion,
pornography, and the breakdown of the family unit…”; for
many, “acceptance of evolution necessarily entails com-
mitment to materialistic atheism…”; evolution, in this
view, is “not just science, but an anti-religious ideology”
(Harrison 2010).
Non-acceptors of evolution frequently express the view
that acceptance of evolution would entail the acceptance of
a host of ideas that they find unacceptable: that life has no
purpose or meaning; that races or ethnic groups are
inherently different; that there can be no supreme being,
afterlife, or spiritual rewards; that evolution means that
people are “nothing more than animals” and therefore hard-
wired for selfishness and ruthless behavior; and that there
can be effectively no free will or self-determination.
Research has specifically found that creationists who are
exposed to evolutionary theory, including its implication of
a close connection between humans and other animals,
have increased thoughts of mortality (Tracy et al. 2011).
Individuals frequently respond to such existential threats by
“becoming more accepting of a theory that offers a greater
sense of meaning by depicting human life has having
ultimate purpose…” (Tracy et al. 2011). For all of these
reasons, the purposeless, materialistic aspect of Darwinian
evolution is highly repugnant to many people (Gould
1974). Intelligent design proponent Phillip Johnson’s
fundamental objection to evolution, for example, is pre-
cisely what he sees as the pernicious effects of materialism
(Johnson 1995; see Pennock 1996, 1999). Similar feelings
are likely widespread. As Thagard and Findlay (2009) put
it: “People do not just think that evolution by natural
selection is false; they want it to be false. Even people who
believe in evolution may admit that they want it to be
false!”
Many evolutionists have argued that evolution neces-
sitates none of these conclusions (Miller 1999; Scott 2009;
Mead and Scott 2010a, b; see Allmon 2009 for a review),
and—as widely emphasized by evolution advocates—most
“mainstream” Christian denominations have accommodated
evolution [Martin 2010; even though such accommodation
has its critics on both the religious and anti-religious sides
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(Allmon 2009)]. Several authors have suggested that if
students knew that such accommodation is possible, it
might lessen their resistance to evolution (Colburn and
Henriques 2006; Scott 2009). Yet such messages are
apparently not widely heard by the general public, perhaps
in part because of contrary views loudly voiced by other
evolutionists that religion and evolution are wholly incom-
patible (e.g., Dawkins 2006; Dennett 2006; Provine 2006;
Coyne 2009b). Indeed, at least a few studies of under-
graduates have found that increased exposure to evolution
produced decreased acceptance and/or increasingly nega-
tive perceptions regarding the consequences of accepting it
(Brem et al. 2003; Sinatra et al. 2003; Lovely and Kondrick
2008). For example, in his course on evolution for non-
majors at Cornell University which he has taught for more
than 20 years, William Provine has found that between the
beginning and end of the course, not only does the
percentage of students accepting evolution go up but so
does the percentage firmly rejecting it (W. Provine,
personal communication).
Psychological Obstacles
A large and rapidly growing body of psychological research
points strongly to a major role for psychological factors in
how and why particular ideas are more readily adopted than
others, and such factors constitute a significant but
frequently underrecognized element of non-acceptance of
evolution. They can be grouped into at least two categories.
First are the numerous processes by which the human mind
appears to overrule what the senses are telling it and which
lead to decisions that appear counter to the perceived
empirical state of the physical world. Second are specific,
apparently innate psychological characteristics and biases in
how humans interpret the world.
As much as logic and rationality contribute to human
thought and despite the rise in the influence of science in
modern society, human reasoning is still suffused with
“affective” influences—emotion, wishes, hopes, beliefs,
faith, illusions—that fly in the face of the “facts” (e.g.,
Harvey 1992; Sutherland 1994; Pohl 2004; Gordon et al.
2005; Fine 2006; Kida 2006; Bering et al. 2011; Mooney
2011; Shermer 2011; Watts 2011). One of the explanations
for such psychological devices appears to be to minimize
cognitive dissonance—the psychological discomfort caused
by mutually contradictory cognitions—which leads a person
to avoid or ignore additional information likely to increase
the dissonance and to seek out additional information that
will reduce the dissonance (Harmon-Jones et al. 1999).
Cognitive dissonance has been suggested as an explanation
for or contributor to a host of human behaviors that go
against what a purely rational or logical assessment of
available empirical information would suggest, including
optimism, wishful thinking, gambling, entrepreneurship, and
many other things that people do every day (Griffiths 1990;
Liang and Dunn 2008; Krizan and Windschitl 2009 and
references therein). Such behaviors, of course, sometimes are
highly beneficial. Optimism, for example, is frequently
associated with better physical health, more persistence in
educational efforts and personal relationships, and resilience
to stressful life events and may be, at least to some degree,
“hard-wired” into the brain (Armor and Taylor 2002; Carver
et al. 2010; Barefoot et al. 2011; Sharot 2011). Yet there is
also evidence that optimist tendencies can lead to engaging
in risky behaviors, which can be hazardous to health and
well-being (e.g., Lovallo and Kahneman 2003; Isaacowitz
2005; Jansen et al. 2011; Sharot 2011).
More significant intentional or unintentional psycholog-
ical dissociation, labeled by psychologists as “self-delu-
sion” or “self-deception,” allows people to persuade
themselves to believe (or accept) what they rationally
“know” is not so (Fingarette 1969; Audi 1988). Psychol-
ogists disagree, however, on exactly what causes or allows
this phenomenon (Trivers 1985; Scott-Kakures 1996; Lazar
1999 and references therein). One interpretation is that
although the self-deceiver holds two incompatible beliefs
and at the same time, one of the beliefs is somehow not
consciously “noticed,” thus allowing the two to avoid direct
comparison and so the realization of their incompatibility.
In this sense, most people hold numerous self-contradictory
beliefs, “if only because we cannot see far enough into the
implications of each of our beliefs” (Fingarette 1969). As
Shermer (2007) puts it: “Smart people believe weird things
because they are skilled at defending beliefs they arrived at
for non-smart reasons.”
Although I am not aware of any psychological research
that specifically addresses the issue of cognitive dissonance
and evolution, it seems reasonable to suggest that it is, at
least in part, in an effort to avoid cognitive dissonance that
individuals committed (for whatever reason) to not-
accepting evolution will—by one or more mechanisms like
those described above—resist embracing, or even encoun-
tering, evidence or arguments that evolution is true.
How we think may also affect what we accept. Woods
and Scharmann (2001) found a significant correlation
between logical thinking skills and acceptance of evolution.
Sinatra et al (2003) similarly reported that students with
more sophisticated and flexible styles of knowledge and
learning were more likely to accept evolution. In several
papers, Lawson and colleagues found that “reasoning ability”
was a strong predictor of the number of misconceptions held
by seventh grade students about genetics and natural selection,
and that “less skilled reasoners” were more likely to have
nonscientific beliefs initially and less likely to change
those beliefs after instruction (Lawson 1985; Lawson and
Thompson 1988; Lawson and Weser 1990).
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Numerous studies have suggested that evolution runs
counter to particular aspects of human psychology. Several
authors, for example, have noted that evolution is in some
ways counterintuitive (Mayr 1982; Evans 2008; Williams
2009; Wiles 2010); for example, evolutionary thinking
states that the apparently stable present world of everyday
experience is a result of ceaseless change and that complex
structures arise from less complex without a conscious
designer. Some of these “everyday” modes of thinking may
be innate patterns and modes of understanding, which
coincidentally frequently tend to resonate better with
creationist views (Evans 2000b, 2008; Poling and Evans
2004). These patterns or biases appear very early in human
development and may constrain “human cognition such that
creationist ideas are attractive and easier to spread, whereas
evolutionary ideas are less contagious” (Evans 2008). Non-
belief in evolution, therefore, may well begin “with the
natural, intuitive development of ‘creationist’ ideas as a very
young child” (Williams 2009). Among such potential
cognitive biases, “two staples of Western philosophical
thinking” in particular “serve to inhibit the expression of
natural explanations for the origins of species” and evolu-
tionary change (Evans 2001): essentialism and teleology.
Essentialism The idea that all living things are separate,
stable, and unchanging [and its corollary that a species’
outward appearance and behavior are determined by a
hidden causal power or “essence” (Shtulman 2006)]
appears to have deep psychological sources in humans
(Samarapungavan and Wiers 1997; Evans 2000a; Poling
and Evans 2004; Shtulman 2006, 2011; Shtulman and
Schulz 2008). Such views are clearly at odds with the
“variational” or “populational” conceptions of the Modern
Synthetic theory of evolution (e.g., Mayr 1982). It is
particularly problematic, however, for the acceptance of
macroevolutionary processes; while “essentialist constraints
can be modified to accept microevolutionary processes…
(they) have to be radically transformed to endorse macro-
evolution” (Poling and Evans 2004). This is why essential-
ism has frequently been identified as one of the principal
historical obstacles to accepting evolution prior to Darwin
(Mayr 1982).
Essentialism is related to other psychologically difficult
concepts that must be confronted in understanding modern
evolutionary explanations. Evolution by natural selection,
for example, is inherently statistical and involves probabi-
listic changes in genes and species, and many authors have
argued that such statistical thinking is unfamiliar and
difficult for most people (Hacking 1975; Birnbaum et al.
1990; Thagard and Findlay 2009). Evolutionary explan-
ations also require appreciation of the related concepts of
emergence and hierarchy, which also do not come naturally
to most people (Chi 2005; Slotta and Chi 2006; Thagard
and Findlay 2009; Meisel 2010). Emergent processes are
those in which large effects result from smaller operations
that are qualitatively different (Holland 1998; Reid 2007).
Unlike simple mechanical systems, in which changes in the
whole system can easily be seen to result from the motions
of its constituent parts, in emergent processes, qualitatively
new changes come about because of many small inter-
actions at lower hierarchical levels. “Not only is evolution
an emergent process on the Darwinian account, but
thinking is also an emergent process on the account
currently being developed in neuroscience…Thus the
human mind is an emergent process resulting from an
emergent process!” (Thagard and Findlay 2009). Hierarchy
is similarly counterintuitive because it cannot be seen
directly, but is inferred based on the relationships of objects
(Grantham 1995, 2001). Hierarchy in evolution is com-
monly presented in phylogenetic diagrams, and the ability
to comprehend evolutionary relationships has come to be
referred to as “tree thinking,” which many authors argue is
frequently very difficult to grasp and to teach (Baum and
Offner 2008; Gregory 2008; Sandvik 2008; Meisel 2010).
Teleology Teleological thinking—the concept that natural
objects have some kind of goal direction, provided by either
a self-directing vital power or divine source, which is the
cause of their functionality—has a long and problematic
history in evolutionary biology. Most evolutionists maintain
that Darwinian natural selection is inherently non-
teleological because it is not goal-directed and does not
anticipate the future (Mayr 1988; Futuyma 2009). Others
point out that evolutionary biologists themselves are
responsible for the persistence of teleological language
and thinking (Weiss 2002; Reiss 2009; González Galli and
Meinardi 2011). For example, Darwin used language that
can be termed teleological (Lennox 1993), and the
ubiquitous reference to natural selection as a “force” or
“mechanism” is evidence of persistent teleological thinking
in modern evolutionary biology (Nehm et al. 2010; Provine
2001; Reiss 2009; González Galli and Meinardi 2011; but
see Ruse 2005).
More generally, the widespread idea that animate
behavior and adaptation are goal- or purpose-directed
has been identified by numerous authors as a major
source of misunderstanding about how evolution by
natural selection works (Jungwirth 1975; Deadman and
Kelly 1978; Clough and Wood-Robinson 1985; Tamir and
Zohar 1991; Pedersen and Halldén 1992; Demastes et al.
1995a; Jensen and Finley 1995, 1996; Kelemen 1999a, b,
c; 2011; Moore et al. 2002; Kampourakis and Zogza 2008;
Evans et al. 2010). Teleology implies that evolutionary
change happens by the transformation of the same basic
quality or essence of all individuals in a species, as
opposed to changes in the relative frequency of individ-
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uals with different characteristics within populations, and
so is utterly incompatible with Darwinian processes
(Shtulman 2006, 2011).
As with essentialism, this intuitive inclination toward
purpose-based teleological explanations appears to origi-
nate early in childhood and, unless it is challenged, persist
into adulthood (Evans 2000a, 2001, 2008; Poling and
Evans 2004; Kelemen 1999a, b, c, Kelemen 2011). This
may occur because, lacking knowledge of scientifically
valid physical causal explanations of natural phenomena,
young children “compensate by drawing on their knowl-
edge of a domain that they know well,” i.e., the
intentionally designed artifacts around them (tools, clothes,
etc.); they thus “plug their explanatory gaps by treating
nature as though it has been made for a purpose by some
kind of underspecified non-human agent” (Kelemen 2011).
This is not because children cannot understand physical
causes (it has been demonstrated that infants can discrim-
inate physical/mechanical causes from intentional causes);
rather, children appear to “intuitively analogize to the
intention-based artifact domain…and evidence a bias to
privilege intentional explanations of events” (Kelemen
2011). This innate response has been called “the intention-
ality bias” (Rosset 2008; see also Wolpert 2006).
Political/Social Influences
Political and social influences may at first seem like
what are herein referred to as “ultimate/secondary”
causes for non-acceptance of evolution (Table 2) because
they provide the milieu in which other factors act, rather
than acting directly to cause particular behaviors or mental
conceptions. Yet this is probably an oversimplification
because social and political factors can, at least occasion-
ally, act directly on individuals and affect their concep-
tions about the world.
For example, rejection or acceptance of an idea may
depend not only on its empirical, philosophical, or
psychological characteristics but also on who suggests,
supports, or attacks it. It may be difficult, for example, to
reject a view provided by parents or another authority
figure because this may, in the mind of the recipient, be
equivalent to rejection of that individual or institution
(Demastes et al. 1995a; Woods and Scharmann 2001;
Williams 2009; Wiles et al. 2011). This can readily translate
into politics. The process of deciding who is a legitimate
authority on particular topics (such as science) can be
socially or politically determined; an individual’s political
affiliation and views about morality and social order, for
example, strongly predict whom they consider to be a
legitimate scientific expert (Kahan et al. 2011; Mooney
2011). Thus, some people may not accept evolution
because it is associated in their minds with a sociopolitical
agenda that they find otherwise unacceptable.
In the U.S., evolution is highly politicized compared to
other developed countries (Forrest and Gross 2004; Gibson
2004; Shanks 2004; Miller et al. 2006; Berkman and
Plutzer 2010) and, as Woods and Scharmann (2001) put it,
“acceptance of evolutionary theory will continue to engen-
der frustration in the United States as long as the cultural
and/or political milieu dictates that it must be so.” Political
orientation is nearly as powerful as education in predicting
evolutionary belief in Americans; the alignment of individ-
uals, groups, and political parties concerning evolution
closely resembles those found with same-sex marriage,
abortion, and other controversial “social” issues (Berkman
and Plutzer 2009). Self-identified political liberals are more
likely than political conservatives to accept that humans
evolved from earlier species (Mazur 2005), and the more
conservative a person’s political views, the less likely he or
she is to accept a great age of the Earth (Cotner et al. 2010).
In the 1990s, the Republican platforms in seven states
included explicit demands for the teaching of “creation
science” (Paterson and Rossow 1999; Miller et al. 2006).
Such political effects on evolution acceptance are not
limited to the U.S. Although Hindu creationism may be
motivated by belief that scriptures such as the Bhagavad
Gita are definitely authoritative, it also has significant roots
in Indian reaction to British colonial rule (Brown 2010).
Discussion
Despite the enormous progress that has been made in
evolution education over the past 20 years or so, we still
lack a comprehensive framework and strategy for how
evolution education can engage with the full spectrum of
obstacles to acceptance/understanding of evolution in and
out of schools, which might allow truly significant
improvements on a national or international scale to be
realized.
Previous work reviewed above makes clear that the
solution to this challenge lies not just in further resolution
of the “religion vs. science” controversy; indeed, this issue
may have no “universally acceptable rational solution”
(Shanks 2004; see also Allmon 2009). Neither does it lie
only in presentation of a more extensive catalog of
empirical evidence or case studies for descent with
modification or natural selection; people come to evolution
with too much psychological baggage. It does not lie just in
better engagement with prior conceptions or better presen-
tation of the nature of science; neither students nor the
general public are sufficiently familiar with the empirical
facts of the natural world. Nor is it only in the overcoming
of a single type of psychological obstacle; as is true for all
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fields of science, studying evolution requires adherence to
“a way of knowing” that, for a wide variety of reasons,
does not necessarily come naturally to all people, meaning
that learning and teaching about it must involve some
degree of “conceptual change” (Sinatra et al. 2008), which
is simply difficult for human beings to undertake.
The solution lies in all of these. Yet every teacher cannot
engage all of the causes listed in Table 1 in every class or
even semester. What then will a successful “comprehensive
framework” for improving acceptance/understanding of
evolution look like? I do not presume to provide an answer
here, only to offer a few conclusions based on the foregoing
discussion:
1. More research. Determining which causes are more
responsible for non-acceptance of evolution, in general
or in any individual case, will require much more
research on why and when different people accept or do
not accept evolution when they are exposed to it,
especially the role of “scientific” vs. “affective” causes
for non-acceptance. Arranging experiments to ade-
quately test different factors is challenging, largely
because of the difficulties of identifying and testing
populations that differ only in the desired variables and
not in others (Wiles et al. 2011). Further, we appear to
be just at the beginning of understanding the psycho-
logical barriers to accepting evolution, and improve-
ment in education will require continued improvement
in such understanding, both in children and adults
(Evans 2000a, b, 2008).
2. Identifying student preconceptions. Most obviously, a
more explicit approach to identification and under-
standing of the causes for non-acceptance of evolution
(such as presented in Table 1) should support the often-
stated goal of understanding “where students are” prior
to implementing the kind of approaches frequently
advocated for teaching evolution, including encourag-
ing students to compare their preconceptions with
scientific ideas, identify limitations in their own ideas,
and construct more scientifically valid understandings.
Just recognizing the complexity of the situation could
be a major improvement. My own experience has been
that, to the degree they think about it at all, many
instructors assume that non-acceptance of evolution in
their students is due to some simple combination of
religion and low scientific literacy; the former is
usually seen as not a teacher’s business, while the
latter can be an excuse to revert to an old-fashioned,
“more content” style of teaching that is otherwise
gradually acquiring a bad name.
3. Implementation. Even when we have this better
understanding, its application in actual educational
settings will require a high level of integration of
multiple educational perspectives and academic disci-
plines (Wilson 2005, 2007; O’Brien et al. 2009), much
more than is normal in most formal educational
settings.
4. Informal science education venues. Even if classroom
evolution education was much more successful than it
is now, that would likely not be enough to raise levels
of Americans’ acceptance and/or understanding of
evolution to where they should be. Americans spend
the great majority of their lives outside of school
(National Research Council 2009; Falk and Dierking
2010); they must therefore continue to have meaningful
opportunities to hear and learn about evolution long
after they leave school, and these opportunities must
navigate the same complex of causes for non-
acceptance as does classroom teaching. This may be
especially challenging for some informal education
venues, such as museums, zoos, parks, and aquaria,
which may have abundant raw material to illustrate the
results of evolution but also typically have the attention
of audiences for very short periods and at times when
they may be as or more interested in leisure than in
learning. How, for example, can a museum exhibit on
the fossil evidence for evolution take into account the
psychological, religious, and/or sociopolitical factors
that may be influencing the thinking of its visitors?
Simply asking such questions (Evans et al. 2010;
Allmon et al. 2012) may be an important step in the
right direction.
Concluding Remarks
One of the main motivations behind this paper was my
growing perception that what appeared to be an adequate
understanding of the causes for and solutions to the
widespread non-acceptance of evolution was not in fact a
solid consensus. Everyone knows that religious beliefs are
often associated with resistance to evolution. Yet when
confronted with the practical task of teaching a particular
class or designing a particular museum exhibit, it quickly
becomes clear that the actual range of potential causes for
non-acceptance is much larger, that neither religion nor
biology is necessarily the right place to start, and that
simply assuming that we know what our audience thinks
and why can lead our educational efforts seriously astray.
Unexpected evidence that I was correct about this lack of
consensus came from comments by two reviewers of this
paper, who stridently objected to various of my conclusions
with words to the effect that “everyone knows,” for
example, that there is no demonstrated relationship between
NOS and acceptance of evolution; that terminological
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confusion and factual misunderstanding are at most only
minor contributors to non-acceptance; that there is no
disagreement in the science education community about
NOS; that there is no empirical support for the idea that
teaching macroevolution will increase acceptance of evolu-
tion; that there is no support for the idea that increased
exposure to evolution can produce decreased acceptance;
and that “good teachers” will automatically know how to
deal with any and all obstacles to their students accepting
evolution. Despite these statements, my review (and re-
review) of the large and growing evolution education
literature, together with my long experience teaching
evolution in a wide variety of settings, demonstrates that
all of these statements are at best oversimplifications and at
worse simply untrue. That these reviews came from very
distinguished individuals in the field of evolution education
reinforces my basic conclusion: that the appallingly
widespread rejection of evolution is a much more compli-
cated problem than most scientists, educators, journalists,
and legislators think it is, and that those who care about
reversing this situation should do more to take this
complexity into account as we seek to come up with new
and more adequate solutions.
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